INTRODUCTION
The Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT) has designated a number of highways as emergency vehicle priority access routes in the event of a catastrophic earthquake. U.S. Highway 60 in southern Missouri is one of these critical corridors. This route is shown on Figure 1 and consists of a four-lane divided highway running primarily east-west.
This critical corridor must be kept open following an earthquake, so MoDOT has initiated a study to evaluate the potential, seismically induced, traffic-disruptive damage to Missouri's roadways and bridges. The section of the highway from Poplar Bluff to Sikeston is particularly vulnerable to earthquake hazards because of its proximity to the New Madrid source zone and its location on a thick sequence of unconsolidated alluvium. This article presents the results of an evaluation of the seismic susceptibility of a 45-mile section of U.S. 60 to earthquake damage. Based on the findings in this study, ideal methods for future lifeline evaluations are recommended.
This work was anticipated to be a pilot study to help establish a protocol for investigating future roadway sections and assessing their susceptibility to closure due to seismic damage. The study is unique in that the expected degree of roadway damage is not as important as the ability of emergency vehicles to navigate the road following an earthquake. It is the first comprehensive study of emergency vehicle access routes in the midwestern United States. 
BACKGROUND Earthquake Levels and History
The greater New Madrid area (southeast Missouri and adjacent portions of Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Arkansas) experiences relatively small-magnitude earthquakes on a regular basis. Figure 2 is a map showing the high level of seismic activity in the region. The New Madrid area is also the site of several of the largestmagnitude (M s 5 8.0-8.3 [Johnston, 1982; Nuttli, 1990] and M b 5 7.2-7.5 [Nuttli, 1982] ) earthquakes to strike North America in recorded history, in 1811-1812. Experts agree that earthquakes of similar magnitude may strike this region again (Johnston, 1982; Nuttli, 1990) .
During and following the 1811-1812 events, southeast Missouri experienced a variety of seismically induced ground problems, including:
Strong ground shaking, up to Mercalli Intensity XI (Nuttli, 1982) or XII (Jibson and Keefer, 1988) Extensive liquefaction and sand boils (Fuller, 1912; Wesnousky and Leffler, 1994) Flooding and land subsidence (Fuller, 1912; Russ, 1982; Boyd and Schumm, 1995) Landslides (Jibson and Keefer, 1988) Disruption of river navigation because of local warping of land (Fuller, 1912; Penick, 1981) Geologic conditions in southeast Missouri make this region among the most susceptible to seismic damage in the country because of thick sediments, high groundwater levels, and vast expanses of flood-sensitive ground. Furthermore, the region is highly populated and developed, particularly when compared with conditions in 1811-1812. If a high-magnitude earthquake were to strike the northern part of the New Madrid area today, the impact would likely be substantial. Levees and dams would be at risk; bridges across the Mississippi and Missouri rivers could be rendered unusable; and landslides, floods, soil liquefaction, and the failure of roadway bridges and overpasses could close extensive sections of highway. The network of facilities and services required for commerce and public health in St. Louis, Sikeston, Cape Girardeau, and the surrounding communities could be severely disrupted. Utilities, including electrical power, sewage and waste disposal, water, and oil and gas distribution, could be disabled until emergency repair crews were able to access affected communities.
Because of the severity of this post-earthquake scenario, the reopening of the designated emergency vehicle priority access routes into St. Louis, Sikeston, and Cape Girardeau is a top priority. Specifically, MoDOT desires to confirm whether its designated emergency routes will sustain only minor earthquake-related damage and can be re-opened efficiently. This requires detailed assessment of the integrity of existing overpasses, bridges, dams, levees, canals, and foundation soils along designated priority routes. Subsequent work will prioritize retrofitting these features (where necessary) or incorporating other risk management strategies such as avoidance.
Regional Geology
Regional geology along the U.S. 60 roadway between Poplar Bluff and Sikeston is characterized by alluvial sands and gravels deposited by the ancestral Mississippi River, underlain by a dipping sedimentary sequence of limestones, dolomites, shales, and sandstones. The study section of U.S. 60 is located along the upper margin of the Mississippi Embayment, as shown on Figure 3 . This portion of the Embayment is Santi, Neuner and Anderson bounded on the west by the Ozark Escarpment in Poplar Bluff, which consists of Paleozoic dolomite and sandstone overlain by thin residual soils. Shallow materials below the study section include Wisconsin braided stream terraces from previous channels of the postglacial Mississippi River. The terraces are broken into two groups, separated at Dexter by the northeast-trending Crowley's Ridge (composed of Wilcox Group sandstone, Figure 4 ). The older, early Wisconsin terraces are located to the west of Crowley's Ridge, spanning from Poplar Bluff to Dexter. The younger, late Wisconsin terraces are located to the east and extend from Dexter to Sikeston (Obermeier, 1989; Saucier, 1994) . The relationship of these terraces to Crowley's Ridge may be seen in the cross-section on Figure 4 .
The early Wisconsin terrace deposits to the west are as thick as 200 ft (Saucier, 1994) , and they consist of sand with some gravel (Grohskopf, 1955) . Near Poplar Bluff, the terraces are overlain by Ozark Escarpment alluvial fan deposits (Saucier, 1994) . The terraces also contain the incised channels of the modern Black and St. Francis rivers (near Poplar Bluff and Fisk, respectively, on Figure 4 ) and an abandoned channel of the St. Francis River (approximately 6 miles east of Poplar Bluff). A more significant abandoned channel of an unnamed creek just west of Dexter has deposited undifferentiated Holocene alluvium along approximately 3 miles of U.S. 60. The slightly elevated Dudley Ridge represents a separate valley fill deposit within the early Wisconsin sequence.
The late Wisconsin terrace deposits to the east are as thick as 150 ft (Saucier, 1994) and are similar in composition to the early Wisconsin terraces. Sikeston Ridge is composed of early Wisconsin materials and is the remnant of a stream terrace deposited before the Mississippi occupied the Dexter-to-Sikeston flood plain. East of the Sikeston Ridge, late Wisconsin materials are overlain by sand and eolian deposits (Saucier, 1994 ).
Crowley's Ridge is a 40-mile-long linear feature trending northeast that near Dexter is a cuesta of resistant Wilcox and Midway Group materials. The ridge is capped by residual soils and loess. (Grohskopf, 1955; Thompson, 1995) .
METHODS AND RESULTS
The evaluation of seismic hazards along U.S. 60 began with field ranking of the vulnerability of bridges to select bridges for more detailed study, followed by subsurface investigation of the bridges, laboratory analysis of soils, computer analysis of slope stability and liquefaction potential, and assessment of flooding potential. Each step in this evaluation is summarized in the following sections.
Ranking of Bridges
Not all seismically induced damage will render the roadway unusable for emergency vehicles. In addition, some damage may be quickly remedied to allow vehicle passage. For these reasons, a ranking system was developed to weigh both the potential for damage to occur as well as the potential for damage to deny emergency vehicle access. The system incorporates hazards from three sources: geology, road and bridge structure, and bridge layout.
Geologic Hazards
Geologic hazards are the conventional geotechnical problems associated with ground shaking, but independent of the structures in question. In general, the geologic hazards along U.S. 60 include slope stability, fill stability, liquefaction, and flooding.
Steep natural slopes above the roadway could fail and block the road to the degree that no vehicles could pass until earth-moving equipment clears the road. Failure of slopes below the roadway could displace driving lanes, although the access route would be denied only if all four lanes were damaged.
Although MoDOT has records of many of the construction details for the roadway and bridges, embankment construction details are less thorough, and construction techniques during initial roadway development (in the mid-1950s) were not as stringent as today. For these reasons, high, steep, and potentially poorly compacted fills are considered to be hazards that could disrupt the roadway. Similarly, settlement of longapproach fills could prevent roadway use, even if the bridges and embankments at the ends of the approaches were relatively undamaged.
Large segments of the roadway overlie liquefactionsusceptible materials. For roadway use to be denied, liquefaction would have to cause high and areally extensive sand boils covering all traffic lanes, lateral spreads that cause embankment settlement, or land subsidence below the regional water table (which is at a depth of 10-20 ft).
Flooding of the roadway could also result from levee failure or from failure of the Wappapello Dam upstream of U.S. 60. Specific liquefaction and flooding susceptibility analyses are conducted separately from the bridge ranking and analysis.
Structural Hazards
Three structural quality aspects could be readily identified in the field and used to rank the relative seismic susceptibility of the bridges. We believe it to be important that field personnel other than structural engineers could readily assess these aspects, because seismic structural analysis was beyond the scope of this stage of seismic hazards analysis.
The first parameter used to rank the structural integrity of each bridge was its age. The age of bridge construction was considered to be a reliable indicator of the degree of seismic readiness, with newer structures expected to perform better. The bridge division of MoDOT initiated seismic design during the period from 1990 to 1992. A chart of bridge ages is included in Table 1 . The years given in the table are the years of bridge construction, rather than the years of actual bridge design. In general, construction took place from 1 to 5 years after design, so the year of construction is not a flawless indicator of the vintage of the seismic standards employed. In a more detailed study, investigators could review construction records to find both the actual year of bridge design and also the seismic components integrated into the design.
The second structural aspect noted was the method of pinning bridge beams to the abutments. Poorly pinned support beams might separate from the bridge abutment and cause the bridge deck to drop. In the case of a low bridge, this situation may not be life threatening, but it could render the bridge useless. The San Francisco Bay Bridge experienced this type of failure during the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989.
The third aspect of structural evaluation was the conditions of bridge piers. Poor pier design or poor pier coupling with soil below the bridge was considered to pose a risk for overall bridge stability. Pier inspections could benefit greatly from the involvement of a structural engineer (as was done for this study); however, it is also possible to qualitatively assess piers based on their observed condition and on the apparent stability of soils surrounding the piers.
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Bridge Layout Hazards
Even with individual bridge failure, the roadway may still be usable for emergency vehicles. Several bridge layouts were identified in which vehicles could use the road even after one or both bridges of the divided highway fail. If the highway has an overpass/exit arrangement, vehicles could simply exit and re-enter the highway if both overpass bridges were to fail. Some bridges are short enough that temporary sections could be laid across the gap to replace failed bridges. The maximum length of a gap that could be spanned depends on the size of military, National Guard, or specially constructed MoDOT sections for this purpose. Finally, many bridges are pairs of older and newer bridges, where even if the older bridge fared poorly in the earthquake, traffic could be diverted across the newer bridge. Evaluation of layout hazards was used not to rank bridges, but rather to eliminate bridges from further consideration. If such hazards were absent, emergency vehicles could still use the highway, even after bridge failure. Therefore, the bridges considered in need of further study were those that did not have nearby exits and bypass roads and that met the following criteria:
Bridge spans in excess of 100 ft (assumed to represent a reasonable length to span temporarily) Locations where both bridges in a pair were constructed before 1992, and neither crossing consisted of a box culvert.
Ranking of Structures and Roadway Sections
Based on the criteria just outlined, 47 bridges were evaluated and given a score during a single field reconnaissance. The scoring team consisted of a highway engineer, a structural engineer, and an engineering geologist, aided by several other professionals with similar areas of expertise. Based on this scoring, the St. Francis River and Wahite Ditch bridges (with paired eastbound and westbound bridges at each location) were selected from the group of poorly scoring bridges as representative of the breadth of geologic conditions along U.S. 60. These bridges were investigated in detail to assess structure and foundation stability. Structural aspects of the analysis and soil-structure interaction are not presented here but may be found in Anderson and others (2001) . The investigation for foundation stability and the related geology are summarized later in this article.
Field Investigation and Local Geology
Exploratory boreholes were advanced at each bridge site using mud-rotary techniques with a CME 850 drill rig provided by MoDOT. At both bridge sites, three 50-ft boreholes, two 100-ft boreholes, and one 200-ft borehole were advanced. The sampling interval varied with depth, and sample types alternated between 3-in. and 5-in. diameter Shelby tubes and standard penetration test (SPT) samples.
Six cone penetrometer (CPT) soundings were completed at the St. Francis River site and five at the Wahite Ditch site, with a goal of advancing the soundings as deep as feasible (estimated 80 ft). Recorded parameters included tip resistance, local friction, pore pressure, and inclination at 0.15-ft intervals, as well as seismic velocity at 3-ft intervals. Parameters calculated or correlated from recorded parameters included friction ratio, soil type, and SPT. In many cases, soil resistance exceeded allowable loading for the cone, and soundings were halted before the target depth was reached.
Five shallow test pits (as deep as 10 ft) were excavated at each site to assess the depth and homogeneity of embankment fill soils.
Based on the results of the subsurface exploration, local geology at the St. Francis River bridge is characterized by the following units, listed from the ground surface downward (shown in cross-section on Figure 5 
Soil Properties
Several soil properties were needed for slope stability analysis, including wet unit weight, saturated unit weight, cohesion, and angle of internal friction. The soil parameters were estimated by correlation with SPT values, CPT tests, MoDOT laboratory tests, and several technical references, as detailed on Table 2 .
The soil properties obtained through this procedure were then averaged for each stratigraphic unit at the St. Francis River and Wahite Ditch, and the resulting values used in slope stability and liquefaction analysis are shown on Table 3 (Neuner, 2001) .
Groundwater Levels
For the stability analysis, two groundwater elevations were selected for analysis at each slope: a low-water condition and a high-water condition. The low-water condition was based on the water elevations measured by MoDOT and by the authors in temporary borehole piezometers in September and October of 1999. These elevations were anticipated to be minimal levels because of the lack of rain for the preceding 6 to 8 weeks. The highwater condition was estimated from the height of the Santi, Neuner and Anderson water staining on the bridge piers and was expected to be the highest reasonable groundwater elevation, representing levels during a prolonged wet season and flooding event. The two groundwater elevations were then used to conduct the static and pseudo-static slope stability analysis at the St. Francis and Wahite Ditch sites (Neuner, 2001) .
The liquefaction analysis was conducted under the assumption that the water table was located approximately 10 ft below ground surface. This estimation was based on data from Brown (1973) , Butler (1985) , and Graves (1983) .
Earthquake Accelerations
Three sets of ground accelerations were selected for slope stability analysis of the St. Francis River and Wahite Ditch sites based on the bedrock accelerations developed by R. B. Herrmann (personal communication, 2001) * and modified by the computer program SHAKE 91, which simulates the effects of groundmotion propagation through the soil column. The sets were as follows:
1. Static conditions, where the slopes are not subjected to earthquake accelerations.
Adjusted peak horizontal ground acceleration (AH-GA). Peak horizontal ground acceleration (PHGA)
was selected for each bridge site as the maximum horizontal acceleration from synthetic time records for each site (R. B. Herrmann, personal communication, 2001). PHGA was adjusted to a level of 66 percent of the original value to represent repeated acceleration levels. Although Kramer (1996) and other researchers recommend using lower values (on the order of 50 percent), we felt it prudent to conduct a slightly more conservative analysis, because the effects of transient pore-water pressures are not accounted for in the analysis, and the strength and density values used in the analysis were obtained in part from published correlations. 3. AHGA with corresponding adjusted peak vertical ground acceleration (AVGA). For this set of analyses, the AHGA values from Set 2 were used along with the corresponding peak vertical ground acceleration (PVGA) occurring at the same time as the PHGA in the synthetic time records. The PVGA was modified using the modification factor C 5 66% 3 PHGA/PVGA (S. Prakash, personal communication, 2001 ) and then adjusted to 66 percent of the modified value. Both positive and negative vertical ground accelerations were analyzed.
Sets 2 and 3 used acceleration values for earthquakes with 2 percent and 10 percent probability of exceedance (PE) in 50 years. The selected design horizontal accelerations were used in the slope stability analysis to represent pseudo-static earthquake conditions for both low and high groundwater. The adjusted accelerations are summarized in Table 4 .
The design accelerations used for the liquefaction potential along the stretch of U.S. 60 are different from those used in slope stability analysis because properly attenuated synthetic seismograms were not available away from the bridge locations. These values were obtained from the peak ground accelerations provided by the U.S. Geological Survey (2000). Accelerations were selected for earthquakes with 2 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent PEs in 50 years, adjusted at various points along U.S. 60 for distances from the epicenter, as calculated by the U.S. Geological Survey (2000).
Slope Stability Analysis
Seven cross-sections were selected for slope stability analysis from the St. Francis River (Figure 7) and seven from the Wahite Ditch site (Figure 8) . At both sites, the cross-sections represented the seven steepest site slopes. The cross-sections were developed from surveyed topographic maps created by MoDOT and from the subsurface information obtained by drilling and CPT soundings (Neuner, 2001) . The cross-section data were then analyzed using the Modified Bishop Method with the slope stability program PCSTABL5 using the preand post-processor STEDwin.
The results for the St. Francis River site are shown in Table 5 . Under Analysis Set 1 (static conditions), all site slopes are expected to be stable regardless of groundwater elevation. Under Analysis Set 2 (horizontal earthquake accelerations), several of the cross-sections are expected to be unstable (FS , 1) or marginally stable (1 FS 1.1) for 2 percent PE earthquake loads, with stability showing a strong sensitivity to groundwater elevation. Under Analysis Set 3 (horizontal and vertical accelerations), all the analyzed slopes are expected to be unstable (FS , 1) for 2 percent PE earthquake loads, regardless of groundwater elevation.
The results for the Wahite Ditch site are shown in Table 6 . The results for Analysis Set 1 show that all site slopes are expected to be stable regardless of groundwater elevation. Under Analysis Sets 2 and 3, several of the slopes show marginal stability (1 FS 1.1) for 2 percent PE earthquake with high groundwater.
In summary, the Wahite Ditch site is closer to the anticipated earthquake epicenter and has higher 2 percent PE horizontal acceleration values, but it has lower corresponding vertical accelerations and better soil conditions. Therefore, the slopes at the Wahite Ditch are expected to perform marginally better during an earthquake than those at the St. Francis River.
Liquefaction Analysis
Susceptibility of the roadway to liquefaction was calculated using the method developed by Seed and Idriss (Idriss, 1999) . The data consist of 12 exploratory boreholes at the St. Francis River and Wahite Ditch and 32 historic boreholes along U.S. 60 obtained from the MoDOT Borehole and Geophysical Data database 
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Santi, Neuner and Anderson (these 32 boreholes were the only ones out of 342 along the roadway that had sufficient SPT data to allow accurate assessment of liquefaction potential). The PHGAs for each borehole location were obtained from U.S. Geological Survey (2000) .
The likelihood of liquefaction was evaluated as a factor of safety defined as the ratio of critical cyclic stress ratio (that which would cause liquefaction) over actual cyclic stress ratio, as calculated using the method of Seed and Idriss (Idriss, 1999) . It is common to assume that liquefaction is likely if the factor of safety is less than 1.2 (S. Prakash, personal communication, 2001) or less than 1.3 (California Division of Mines and Geology, 1997). A factor of safety of 1.0 was used for this study because conservative earthquake acceleration values were used.
Because SPT values in the borings were generally measured at 5-ft intervals, the severity of liquefaction was judged by the number of 5-ft layers that would potentially liquefy at each boring location. This procedure was completed for earthquakes with PEs of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 2 percent in 50 years. In general, the number of 5-ft layers having potential liquefaction was reported in four hazard levels: low (0 layers Calculated from cone resistance and friction ratio, using methods in Meigh (1987) Preliminary Evaluation of Seismic Hazards Similar to 5 percent PE conditions, except that the stretch of highway 5 miles west of Sikeston has severe liquefaction potential
As a check on the accuracy of the analysis, the liquefaction calculations just summarized, using peak ground accelerations from the U.S. Geological Survey (2000), were compared with liquefaction calculations at the two bridge sites using synthetic seismograms, specifically attenuated to the bridge sites and propagated through the soil column using SHAKE 91. Both methods of calculation indicated similar degrees of liquefaction susceptibility. AHGA 5 adjusted horizontal ground acceleration (proportion of acceleration of gravity, g); AVGA 5 adjusted vertical ground acceleration (both positive and negative values analyzed); PE 5 probability of exceedance value in 50 years. Corps of Engineers (1985) . Flooding caused by failure of waterway levees was evaluated using data from the eleven 7.5-minute topographic maps covering the study section of U.S. 60. Federal Emergency Management Agency Flood Hazard Boundary maps were not used, because the majority of the roadway was classified as Zone A (no base flood elevation determined for the 100-year flood zone). Elevations of ditch-and streamwater levels were compared with sections of roadway to identify zones of potential flooding. These zones were verified in the field. Hazards were estimated based solely on relative elevations of land and waterways, assuming complete failure of either levees or the dam. The likelihood of such failure during an earthquake was not calculated, so the flood hazard analysis is considered a worst-case scenario. However, levee or dam failure was assumed to occur during moderate-flow conditions and not during flood or elevated water conditions in the waterways.
Flood Hazard Analysis
In general, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1985) The evaluation of the effects of flooding due to failure of levees is considered tentative, because some of the maps were as old as 1962 vintage, without photorevision. Furthermore, the roadway elevation was shown only to 5-ft accuracy, and slight elevations or depressions in the roadway could significantly change the degree of anticipated flooding. In general, the following conditions are expected for each waterway along the study section, presented in order from west to east (numbers match those shown on Figure 9 ):
1. Blue Spring Slough: Failure of the levee could potentially flood a 1-mile section of the roadway flanking the slough and a 0.25-mile section of the roadway 1 mile west of Highway FF. 4. Lick Creek: The roadway appears to be elevated above the surrounding land in this area, and flooding is not anticipated.
5. Unnamed creek 1 mile west of Essex: Failure of levees could potentially flood a 0.1-mile section of roadway.
6. Bess Slough: It appears that the roadway is elevated in the vicinity of this waterway, except for a 0.5-mile section located 0.5 to 1 mile west of Highway FF, which may possibly flood in the event of a levee failure.
7. Six unnamed ditches between Bess Slough and the Castor River: The roadway and surrounding fields appear to be elevated between Highways FF and N to the west. Areas to the east that may potentially flood include a 0.5-mile section located 0.5 to 1.0 mile east of Highway N, two sections 100 to 300 ft in length located 1.0 to 1.25 miles east of Highway N, and a 1-mile section located 1.5 to 2.5 miles east of Highway N.
8. Castor River: The river appears to be separated from the original flow source and is expected to have a limited flowing length and flooding potential.
9. Wahite Ditch: Water level appears to be too low during normal conditions to pose a significant risk of exiting the channel, even in the event of levee failure. Furthermore, the roadway is elevated above the surrounding land. One section of roadway located 0.1 to 0.5 mile west of the ditch is at low elevation and could potentially flood.
The remaining section of the roadway east of the Wahite Ditch appears to be elevated and is not anticipated to experience flooding due to levee failure. Figure 9 . Calculated liquefaction susceptibility of U.S. 60 for various design earthquake accelerations. Shading corresponds to the number of 5-ft soil layers with calculated factors of safety less than 1 (actual cyclic stress ratio in excess of critical cyclic stress ratio). 
!
DISCUSSION
Based on the analyses presented here, it appears that the most significant potential seismic impact from geologic hazards is instability of embankment fills leading up to and underlying the bridges. Slope failures could rupture driving lanes, separate the roadway from the bridge deck, or rotate bridge piers. Liquefaction is also expected to occur, although the extent of settlement, the effects of lateral spreads, and the potential impacts to the roadway were not evaluated. Because of the distributed nature of past liquefaction boils, we anticipate it is unlikely that liquefaction-induced settlement would be extensive enough to deny roadway use. Similarly, flooding impacts could be severe, but based on the simplified analysis conducted here, it appears that significant flooding would require simultaneous high water levels in waterways and saturated, weak levee soils at the time of the earthquake. These conditions are considered less likely than the conditions required for slope failure.
This work was anticipated to be a pilot study to help establish a protocol for investigating future roadway sections and assessing their susceptibility to closure due to seismic damage. Investigation of individual bridges by traditional drilling, sampling, and laboratory testing was acceptable, although CPT data providing correlations to SPT values proved to be very useful for liquefaction analysis. CPT shear wave data were also crucial for SHAKE 91 analysis of seismic-wave propagation from bedrock upward through the soil column. Historic borelog data along the highway right-of-way were of limited usefulness because of the lack of SPT data or other soil strength or density information. In future assessments, CPT soundings should be used as an economical and quick method to generate soil density data away from bridges in areas where data for liquefaction analysis are sparse.
CONCLUSIONS
A simple ranking system was developed to assess the potential that earthquake damage to bridges or bridge embankments could deny roadway use. The St. Francis River and Wahite Ditch bridges were among the most susceptible to this scale of damage, and based on a detailed investigation, slopes at the Wahite Ditch show marginal stability (1 FS 1.1), and those at the St. Francis River show instability (FS , 1) when subjected to 2 percent PE earthquake loads.
Liquefaction and flooding potential were evaluated for the entire 45-mile section of the highway from Poplar Bluff to Sikeston. Approximately half of this section, from Poplar Bluff to Dexter, is moderately susceptible to liquefaction, as defined by the number of 5-ft soil layers expected to exceed their critical cyclic stress ratios under 10 percent PE earthquake shaking. The entire roadway is moderately to strongly suscepti- ble to liquefaction under 5 percent PE earthquake shaking. Similar results to 5 percent PE shaking are found for 2 percent PE shaking, with the exception of the section of roadway within 5 miles of Sikeston, which shows severe liquefaction potential.
Several stretches of highway could be flooded and rendered impassable in the event of catastrophic failure of regional waterway levees or failure of the Wappapello Dam.
